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INDIANAPOLIS COLTS, INC. V. METROPOLITAN BALTIMORE FOOTBALL
CLUB, CLUB LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 63 USLW 2126, 31 U.S.P.Q.
2d 1811 (7th Cir. 1994).
The Indianapolis Colts ("Indianapolis") and the National
Football League ("NFL") brought suit for trademark infringement
against the Canadian Football League's ("CFL") new team in Bal-
timore ("Baltimore") which wanted to call itself the "Baltimore
CFL Colts." The NFL "Colts" played in Baltimore for 32 seasons.
However, in 1984, the team's owner, with the permission of the
NFL, moved the team to Indianapolis, where it was renamed the
"Indianapolis Colts." Baltimore fans were outraged at the move,
and tried unsuccessfully to get the team back.
The CFL granted a franchise for a Baltimore team in 1993 and
the team's owner decided to name it the "Baltimore Colts." Upon
discovering this, the NFL threatened legal action, and Baltimore
changed its name to the "Baltimore CFL Colts" and began licens-
ing merchandise and launching publicity under that name in prep-
aration for its upcoming season. Indianapolis obtained a prelimi-
nary injunction preventing Baltimore from using the name
"Baltimore CFL Colts" in connection with playing professional
football, broadcasting football games, or selling merchandise, and
Baltimore appealed the order granting the injunction.
Held: The court of appeals, not wishing to prejudice the trial
on the merits, denied Baltimore's appeal in a "tentative" opinion.
The two issues before the court were whether the preliminary in-
junction granted by the district court in Indiana was proper, and
whether that court had personal jurisdiction over Baltimore. Rea-
soning that the state in which the injury occurs is the state in
which the tort occurs, the court held that Baltimore was amenable
to suit in Indiana via its long-arm statute because Indianapolis
uses the trademarks they sought to defend mainly in Indiana, and
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if the trademarks were impaired as alleged, the injury would be felt
mainly in Indiana.
On the question of whether the district court's preliminary in-
junction was proper, the court held that the likelihood of the NFL
and Indianapolis succeeding on their trademark infringement
claim that Baltimore's use of the name "Baltimore CFL Colts"
would confuse the consuming public warranted a preliminary in-
junction against Baltimore's use of the name. In deciding this is-
sue, the court discussed whether Baltimore could appropriate the
name "Baltimore Colts." Baltimore contended that when a mark is
abandoned, it returns to the public domain and is appropriable
anew, urging the court to adopt the decision in Major League
Baseball Properties Inc. v. Sed Olet Denarius, Ltd., 817 F. Supp.
1103 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). In that case, over the objection of the Los
Angeles Dodgers, a restaurant in Brooklyn was allowed to use the
name "Brooklyn Dodger" on the ground that the "Brooklyn
Dodger" was a nontransportable cultural institution separate from
the "Los Angeles Dodgers." In deciding that case, Chief Judge Pos-
ner declared that while the above statement is true in principle, it
may not always apply in practice, reasoning that the subsequent
use of an abandoned mark may evoke a continuing association with
the mark's prior use, and those making the subsequent use may be
required to take reasonable precautions to prevent confusion.
This idea is especially important where, as in this latest case,
the former owner of the abandoned mark continues to market the
same product or service under a similar name. Furthermore, the
"Brooklyn Dodger" was a restaurant, not a baseball team, and un-
like the case at hand, there was no risk of confusion in Major
League Baseball. The court found it likely that the Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C. 1125 (1993), would protect the trademark in a trial on
the merits, because if the consuming public is likely to be confused
by Baltimore's use of the name, then there is a harm for which the
Act provides a remedy. If a consumer buys merchandise stamped
"Baltimore CFL Colts," or watches the team on television, believ-
ing he or she is following the NFL team, then Indianapolis and the
NFL will be harmed because they will lose revenue.
In assessing expert testimony presented to the district court
on the likelihood of Baltimore's use of the mark causing confusion
among the consuming public, the court considered the similarity of
the marks and of the parties' products, the average consumer's
knowledge of the products, the overlap in the parties' geographical
markets and other relevant factors. The appellate court decided
the district court did not commit clear error in finding the plain-
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tiffs' expert's study to be more credible than that performed by the
defendant's expert. Affirmed.
L.H.
NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION V. WILLIAMS
WILKINS V. NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, 857 F. Supp. 1069
(S.D.N.Y. 1994)
The National Basketball Association ("NBA") and the
twenty-seven teams that compete in it ("Teams") initiated an ac-
tion seeking a declaratory judgment that the NBA's use of a col-
lege draft, salary cap and right of first refusal do not violate anti-
trust laws. Additionally, the NBA and the Teams wanted to
continue these policies following the expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement which allowed them. The class of players
who were defendants in the NBA's declaratory judgment claim
("Players") counterclaimed, alleging that continuation of the poli-
cies in question would be an unreasonable restraint on trade and
thus violate the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1.
The 1988 Collective Bargaining Agreement, the most recent
agreement between the NBA and the Players, continued the col-
lege draft, right of first refusal and salary cap policies as set forth
in earlier agreements. The 1988 Agreement formally expired on
June 23, 1994, at which time the Players demanded the three dis-
puted employment practices be eliminated. The NBA contended
that antitrust law did not apply because, despite the expiration of
the formal agreement, a collective bargaining relationship still ex-
isted between the NBA and the Players, and that the non-statu-
tory labor exemption therefore applied.
Held: The court, finding no case on point, agreed with the
NBA that antitrust immunity given by the nonstatutory labor ex-
emption continued as long as a collective bargaining relationship
existed between the NBA and the Players after the expiration of
the formal agreement. Following the reasoning of Bridgeman v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987), the
court refused to accept the Players' contention that antitrust im-
munity ends the moment a collective bargaining agreement ex-
pires. It also indicated that such antitrust immunity survives only
as long as the employer continues the policies in question un-
changed and reasonably believes such policies will be continued in
the next collective bargaining agreement. As the three disputed
practices were part of several prior agreements between the NBA
and the Players, the NBA could reasonably believe they would be
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